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1. IntroductIon
TThe world is under persistent threat from a variety of toxic 
chemicals, micro-organisms and radioactive materials that can 
be used as weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Terrorists are 
continuously becoming sophisticated, particularly in aspects of 
their planning of terrorist operation with the adoption of newer 
modalities, techniques and strategies. They continue to adapt 
and exploit the developments in technology and improving the 
efficiency of existing methods1. Moreover, Non-state Actors 
and terrorists have ideological, financial, and logistical links 
with various like-minded individuals/organisations. Their force 
multiplier includes not only connections (good networking 
amongst themselves as well as with rogue nations/scientists) 
but also include swiftness and flexibility in all their operations. 
Furthermore, the basic information about chemical, biological 
and radiological (CBR) agents, knowledge on their means of 
delivery and Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs) etc., is 
nowadays easily available in open domain literature and on 
internet. Easy availability of dual use chemicals is another 
concern as some of the CBR materials are also used for a variety 
of legitimate purposes, e.g., chemical, pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries; nuclear medicine and radiotherapy 
facilities and in nuclear power generation. Security around 
stockpiles of decommissioned civil ormilitary CBR materials, 
is variable in different parts of the world and sometimes 
grossly inadequate. A reported increase in illicit trafficking of 
CBR agents globally and the role played by rogue countries in 
clandestinely propagating proliferation of CBR Technologies, 
further enhances this criticality. Terrorists misuse or sabotage 
of CBR materials may result in worst case scenarios2-3. 
Terrorist may choose a crowded place or a building of national 
importance for creation of utmost impact and disruption leading 
to mass casualty incidence (MCI). 
Another fact is that virtually all CBR weapon states 
possess deep strike capability. North Korea is threatening to 
employ long range missiles for delivery of CBR materials 
against many nations. Test firing of OMAR-1 missile by Tahrik-
e-Taliban, Pakistan in April 2015, added another dimension to 
the impending threats, as it would enable covert targeting of 
facilities from remote locations. This present challenges to 
secure critical structures from CBR threats emanating from 
well-known terrorist organisations like Aum-Shrinkiyo, Al-
Qaeda and IS. Recent spurt in activities of Lone Wolf attackers, 
Home grown Terrorist outfits, and Suicide Terrorism also needs 
to be carefully watched from CBR standpoint. 
CBR attacks/incidents are relatively uncommon due to 
high safeguard protective measures that are usually put in 
place. Nevertheless, in the past few years, there have been an 
increasing number of incidences or near misses with evidences 
that terrorist groups are plotting or seeking to create horror 
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by using CBR agents. These attacks can cause exposure/
contamination of a large numbers of people to toxic CBR 
materials especially if carried out in confined spaces. CBR 
attacks should be taken as act of criminal significance targeted 
to inflict greatest damage. Such act calls for early identification 
of CBR agents and consequent decisive actions for their 
prevention and mitigation. Multi-agency response is aimed to 
ensure everybody sings off from the same hymn sheet, using the 
same language. This will lead to a well-organised, coordinated 
and effective response.
On the basis of the hazardous toxic nature of CBR 
agents, these can be broadly categorised into three groups, i.e., 
Chemical, Biological and Radiological.
1.1 chemical Agents 
Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) have become a familiar 
word in public domain after their release in World war -I, Japan 
(1994, 1995); Halabja, Iraq (1988); Damascus, Syria (2013); 
and Iraq (2015)4-7. Commercially available toxic industrial 
chemicals/ materials (TICs/TIMs) further widen the chemical 
threat spectra. As early as October 2006 Chlorine bombings in 
Iraq began and insurgents in Al-Anbar province used chlorine 
gas in conjunction with conventional vehicle-borne explosive 
devices. IS had managed to seize a former chemical weapons 
depot at al-Muthanna facility, located northwest of Baghdad, 
wherein around 2,500 chemical rockets filled with deadly nerve 
agent and their remnants, were stored along with other CWAs 
in Northern Iraq. Chemical weapons produced at al-Muthanna 
facility, are believed to include Mustard gas, Sarin, Tabun, 
and VX. Signs and symptoms of these chemical agents could 
range from ‘stinking smell’, difficulty in breathing or stinging 
of the eyes, experiencing nausea and vomiting, seizures, 
faintness, or ultimate death. The onset of the symptoms 
varies significantly according to time from instantaneous to 
several days depending on the agent used. The detection of 
various unknown chemicals with help of infrared devices 
traditionally relies on the matching of measured signals with 
library of signals included in the database. Mitigation of 
chemical attacks, require much more rapid medical attention 
to minimise their deleterious health effects8-9. CWAs are likely 
to be used by terrorist at critical national assets and adequate 
preparedness for response is required6,9-13.
1.2 Biological Agents 
 Biological Agents Natural outbreaks of a number of 
microbial diseases or intentional use of either natural or 
genetically modified micro-organisms/toxins leading to 
disability, diseases or death, is a matter of great concern. 
Distinction between a naturally occurring epidemic or 
endemic diseases and biological warfare attacks by terrorists 
is not always easy unless conclusively proved. Attacks 
employing toxic biological agents are more difficult to 
detect, and even cannot be suspected before the appearance 
of the disease symptoms after latent lag period. Unless the 
Toxic Biological Material (TBM) is in sufficient quantity to 
appear as a powder, it would most likely go unnoticed (as 
in case of the 2001 anthrax mails). The biological agents 
like agents like Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Variola, 
tularensis, which causes anthrax, plague, smallpox, and 
tularaemia disease respectively, after their dispersal in the 
air, are mostly invisible. However, the consequential damage 
inflicted would be enormous. Acquisition or production of 
toxins such as botulinum and ricin by terrorists is not very 
difficult. Snail mail employing anthrax and ricin have been a 
preferred means of delivery for biological agents and toxins 
since beginning of 21st century to terrorize/harm political 
figures, and personnel employed in intelligence agencies & in 
print/electronic media. An umbrella designed to inject a toxic 
pellet of ricin, was used to assassinate Bulgarian dissident 
Georgi Markov, the then BBC World Service journalist, on 
September 7, 1978 in London, UK. for designing effective 
response strategies, there should be a clear understanding, 
whether these agents are contagious or not. Contagious 
diseases such as smallpox that can be transmitted from person-
to-person (therefore, more difficult to manage) are worrisome. 
Whereas a non-contagious diseases such as anthrax would 
infect individuals who have been directly in contact with 
the anthrax spores. However, these spores might also lead 
to distressing impacts in view of their ease of spread-ability 
and steadiness14.
1.3 radiological Agents
At present, radiological terrorism is a real and imminent 
threat for the world15-17. For terrorists to lay their hands on 
toxic radiological material (TRMs) is a bit difficult, but not 
totally impossible. Security of these materials in agriculture, 
industry, nuclear medicine and oncology clinics, is mostly 
tentative in a large part of the world. Therefore, the likelihood 
for the terrorist to carry out a nuclear sabotage or radiological 
attacks can’t be ruled out. Non-state actors or terrorists may 
spread radioactive materials anywhere using suitable dispersal 
devices (e.g., aerosols, explosives, and aerial spraying 
mechanisms). Radiological exposure device (RED) such as 
strapped / containerised TRMs may be used17. Improvised 
nuclear device (IND) is a low yield nuclear device whose use 
may cause harm to human life, critical infrastructures and 
environment17-18. Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or crude 
dirty bomb could cause small scale incident and may result 
in contamination of men and materials including substantial 
property damage. This may spur mass panic by provoking 
people’s fear of radiation. Centre for Non-proliferation 
Studies (CNS) database, publicly reported 325 incidents 
(155 in 2013 and 170 in 2014) across 38 different countries 
where nuclear/radioactive materials was either lost, stolen, 
or otherwise went outside of regulatory control (orphaned 
sources)21. Thousands of potentially harmful radiation sources 
are annually reported as orphan sources all over the world.” 
According to an IAEA Report, ‘orphaned’ sources have been 
reported 266 persons had been overexposed and 39 died in 
60 severe radiological accidents21”. Fortunately, just one of 
these incident involved less than a gram of highly enriched 
and directly weapons-usable Uranium, and only 5 per cent of 
these cases involved high risk radioactive sources. The need 
of the hour is to implement a more stringent regulatory policy 
for the safety/security and containment of these radiological 
materials. 
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2. cBr tHreAt PercePtIon
Important national assets such as metro trains, banks, 
parliament, defence head-quarters, airports, secretariat, 
chemical industries, biotech-industries, nuclear power plant, 
and major secondary or tertiary case hospital etc., could be 
soft targets for the terrorist. CBR threat perception pose series 
of challenges including fear of unknown ( due to uncertain 
knowledge about the causative agent and associated health 
effects); potentiality to cause death, disability or disease 
including long-term health concerns; and exponential spread 
of exposed/contaminated victims etc. When it is at its worse, it 
can also cause public chaos, and may results in contaminated 
environment, wrong perception, and media scrutiny, collapse 
of civil order and essential services, and ultimately leading 
to almost complete disruption of the society. There are many 
indications that non-state actors and terrorists have already 
acquired CBR technologies and intended to use them for 
malicious purposes in covert attacks (including those in low-
intensity conflicts). Even though CBR incidences involving 
CWAs, TICs, TIMs, TBM and TRMs etc., are considered as 
low frequency event, still the possibility of their happening 
and the overall impact they may create, remains very high. 
Experience shows that crowded and confined places like 
subway, sport venues and other critical national assets, etc., 
serve as an attractive and likely target for terrorists. Indian 
parliament attack in 2001 by Lashkar- e- taiba and Jaish-e 
-mohammed terrorists resulted in 12 deaths (5 terrorist, 6 police 
and 1 civilian)22. Thus, we can lose critical infrastructures, 
important persons or a crucial capability for longer period 
of time as a result of a CBR attack. Internationally important 
meetings or games that are organised regularly world-
over provides a platform of high level threat and enhanced 
possibility for a CBR attack. These attacks could be deliberate, 
parallel/sequential incidences including follow-on attacks on 
Medical First Responders and hospitals23. Synchronised serial 
blast in Ahmadabad (India) Civil Hospital’s Trauma Centre 
is one of the most disgraceful, inhumane, cruel and barbaric 
act against mankind that resulted in five mortalities and many 
more injuries.
furthermore, such types of attacks highlight the need to 
ensure that the workers in such facilities/institutions/installation 
must be trained to recognise such attacks on the basis of common 
sense, followed by confirmation using different on-site/off-site 
detectors. Some incidents in general, tend to be more time 
critical, for substances especially that have a rapid onset of 
effect. CBR contaminants are often a matter of concern due to 
their late or delayed effects. The high probability of occurrence 
of CBR terrorism incidents has forced all governments and 
international organisations worldwide to review their existing 
safety, security, protection and response plans. They must 
develop new strategies and procedures, and up-to-date the 
protection and emergency plans. The CBR emergency response 
plan should be doable and quickly implementable24. 
The main deterrent to an overt CBR warfare is fear of 
International condemnation and estrangement of the attacking 
country that can cripple its economy. But a CBR attack through 
terrorist organisations and non-state actors duly supported by 
rogue nations is a clear possibility in the present context and pose 
a real danger to the entire world. The terrorist’s organisations 
always crave for publicity and can go to any extent to achieve 
their sadistic motives. Attack by a terrorist organisation using 
a full-scale nuclear weapon is highly improbable. However, it 
could be a distinct possibility in the near future in the view of 
the alleged claims by IS that they will purchase ready-made 
nuclear weapons from international black market or rogue 
nations. 
3. cBr AttAcKs: LIKeLy scenArIos And 
tArget
CBR attack perception involves the assessment of 
vulnerabilities, prevention through physical security and 
mitigation. The CBR threat scenarios fall into four major 
categories, e.g., fast-acting, delayed-acting, contagious and 
non-contagious. Fast-acting chemical agents’, e.g., Sarin, 
Hydrogen cyanide etc., shows symptoms in seconds to 
minutes. Delayed acting chemical agents and bio-toxins, e.g., 
mustard, arsine, botulinum toxin, ricin etc., toxic chemicals 
that cause no or very few detectable symptoms, may take from 
hours to days to show effects. Contagious and non-contagious 
biological agents biological agents causes no initial symptoms, 
or typically flu-like symptoms after a few days or weeks, and 
are problematic after the victims become symptomatic25. 
Dissemination techniques may include aerosol (i.e., 
liquid or solid particle), gas release, indoor/outdoor airborne 
attacks, and special release devices like pressurised vessels, 
and explosives in the public areas, and directed to the critical 
facilities/establishments. CBR attacks have the potential to 
show impact in large areas causing morbidity and mortality 
that may escalate to MCI. This may also result in large-scale 
contamination of the personnel, buildings, surrounding areas, 
materials present in the vicinity as well in downwind areas. 
Important national assets and critical infrastructures that 
are likely targets and their vulnerability towards the CBR 
attacks is depicted in fig. 1. CBR attacks act as a shock to the 
personnel involved in security and actual services as well as a 
challenge for government to counter them effectively. Buildings 
of national importance must be under high security vigilance 
by trained personnel to prevent happening of any CBR attack 
at the first instance. Target populations may include various 
employees as well as the transit population during working 
hours.
4. desIred AwAreness LeveLs of tHe 
securIty PersonneL And emPLoyees 
of tHe crItIcAL InfrAstructure 
for effectIve resPonse
Buildings harboring important activities could be soft 
targets for attackers. A centrally air conditioned building can 
be quickly contaminated with CBR agents by terrorist after 
introducing these agents into the heating ventilation and air-
conditioning (HVAC) units system. Whether in the battlefield, 
urban settings or at the site of any confined space including 
national assets, the attack response needs immediate counter 
of the CBR agents in an accountable and responsive manner. 
Response to a typical CBR incidence including important 
aspects of an ideal response is presented in Fig. 2.
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Security/personnel/workers must be trained to act and 
to combat such situations. Regular table top exercises and 
rehearsal of on-site/off-site emergency plans by carrying 
out mock drills can help to protect the men and materials 
in case of actual CBR attacks. Emergency responders and 
building operators must be capable of dealing with the CBR 
release in the building. Buildings must be secure with the 
access open to only authorised personnel. In case of CBR 
emergency, cascades of instant operations are required such 
as evacuation assistance, shelter in place, communication with 
authorities, decontamination and medical management with 
countermeasures. 
USA has made the preparedness posture against CBRN 
threat agents as well as stockpiling 21 product for potential 
use for public health emergencies repertories of medical 
countermeasures. People with well-defined role clarities and 
responsibilities, should always be ready with backup. Some 
other important actions needed include: No permanent seal 
outdoor air intakes, No modification on HVAC system, Establish 
a security zone around outdoor air intakes to prevent access 
to these areas, Prevention of unauthorised public access to 
mechanical areas and building roofs, Security implementation 
measures such as guards, alarms and close circuit television 
(CCTV) to protect vulnerable areas and restriction to outside 
personnel to building operation, information and physical 
security upgrades. Some possible indicators for the chemical 
attacks would be explosion with little or no structural damage, 
mist or vapour, multiple casualties with similar symptoms, 
mass casualties with no apparent reason or trauma, report of 
unusual odours, liquids\spray devices or cylinders and dead 
birds/animals. Possible indicators for a biological attack would 
be inexplicable human illness, mysterious mortality of living 
organisms, and symptoms of diseases caused by the agents. In 
some situations like anthrax laden letters post 9/11, people may 
be pre-alerted to a potential exposure. USA has made significant 
progress in preparing for disasters and advancing public health 
infrastructure for bio-defence security. For a radiological 
attack, common indicators includes nausea, vomiting, skin 
irritation, blackening of finger nail and skin, hair fall and other 
peculiar effects depending on the type and extent of exposure/ 
radio-nuclides involved in the incidence.
Figure 2. After a CBR accident/incident different challenges and issues like contamination of men, materials and environment could 
occur. CBR emergency sites must clearly be demarcated to different operational zones. For effective response capacity 
development and operational capability should be enhanced by regular training and testing of emergency plans.
Figure 1. Important national assets vulnerable to CBR attacks.
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5. PrePAredness for tHe cBr 
resILIence of nAtIonAL Assets And 
crItIcAL InfrAstructures 
CBR agents may be disseminated in a specific confined 
structure by using air-burst bomb or by saboteurs employing 
various methods. Due to high impact nature of CBR agents, 
first responders and receivers of emergency victims must 
have adequate knowledge, skills, equipment and devices (e.g., 
prophylactic measures, decontamination agents and medical 
countermeasures) to manage these scenarios even at short 
notice. P reparedness for medical management of persons should 
be evolved as a part of the overall safety and security strategy. 
for effective prevention and emergency response, important 
points include vigilance, training, and application of common 
sense to recognise such hazardous incidents; Careful hazard 
response planning and regular exercising of capabilities and 
Possession of resources to mitigate the health effects of CBR 
materials. Corrective actions that should be taken immediately 
after incidents are evacuation of the victim from ground zero; 
resuscitation/stabilised; triage; decontamination at the incident 
site; evacuation to a safe holding area and transportation; 
hospital level decontamination and specific treatment.
5.1 cBr Protection 
CBR Protection requires building a safer and resilient 
infrastructure and associated resources by nurturing a culture of 
prevention, mitigation and preparedness for prompt response. 
The entire process will provide momentum and sustenance 
through the collective efforts of all concerned government 
agencies, private player and stakeholders. CBR Resilience 
can be augmented by improving proactive strengthening of 
security and response so as to reduce overall vulnerability. A 
comprehensive list of critical infrastructure assets including 
various hazardous sites (chemical, biological and nuclear 
facilities) should be available to security agencies and response 
organisations. Security agencies should be able to prevent access 
of hazardous substances by terrorist and to prioritise protective 
security measures according to risk perception and maximum 
loss scenario. Hazardous sites of chemical, explosive stores, 
pathogen and toxin laboratories and radiological sources like 
nuclear medicine units and tele-therapy units in hospitals are 
potential areas to be critically watched. for effective proactive 
response, risk management plan must be revisited and updated 
at regular intervals. 
Level of the protection and planning should be primarily 
derived from vulnerability assessment. Government should 
take appropriate steps to increase the CBR resilience of the 
critical infrastructure and security for crowded places. Owners 
and operators of critical infrastructures must be adequately 
equipped and have trained responder forces for handling CBR 
emergencies. Infrastructure can be categorised according to 
its value or ‘criticality’, which can be determined on the basis 
of the impact of its loss on business continuity. This could be 
analysed by using the criticality scale which depends on three 
different dimensions such as impact on life, economy, and 
essential services. 
Pre-event planning and decision making (considerations 
in identifying the key, critical information and decision criteria) 
for facilitation of post-attack management activities are also 
important preparedness aspects to deter any such eventuality. 
In case of confined space, various employees as well as 
transit passengers may be the likely targets. The important 
aspects includes developments on CBRN protective clothing, 
the importance of forecasting models of protection and 
improving the comfort and physiological stress, development 
and modification of membranes and construction models, 
development of pronunciation and validated models for 
consequence of impact assessment, including cascading events 
to all the way up to societal impact joined to the application as 
well as exploitation of such models to major CBR scenarios. 
To protect critical national assets, the measures that should be 
implemented includes: reduce vulnerability through measures 
that are proportionate to the risk, raise physical security (e.g., 
perimeter security and multi-parametric security systems), 
augment personnel security (e.g., pre-employment screening 
and creation of security culture) and enhance cyber security 
(e.g., technical control, policies and procedures).
After implementing of these tight regulations and self 
assessment tool, a noticeable reduction in vulnerability of 
higher risk sites can be achieved. Countering terrorism, 
protect (restricted site access), prepare (model response), and 
pursue forensic capability, are other essential for competence 
development. Enhancing capability to detect CBR agents; 
denying terrorist access to knowledge and materials; and 
improving the effectiveness of response to recover after incident, 
are additional suggested measures. Intelligence agencies 
should augment co-operation and working relationships with 
critical industry and wider government/private sector, who 
own most of the infrastructure sites. Post-event remediation 
and restoration activities are necessary to attain reusable or 
normalised facilities.
5.2 Development of Systems to Quickly Detect and 
Thwart Covert CBR Attacks
Security should specifically address the policies and 
procedures associated with the physical security staff and 
transportation security along with material control and 
information secrecy. It should also include emergency response 
plan that address specific issue like general protocols that 
could be used at the incident site because the likelihood of a 
specific building targeted is difficult to predict. The building 
operator must take their own decisions about how to reduce 
their building’s risk to a CBR attack. Building operators can 
reduce threat of CBR agents to a great extent by increasing the 
security at all the entry points. Protection from the other types 
of attacks such as building collapse, explosions and water 
supply contamination require different sets of measures. The 
building management authorities would implement CBR retro-
fittings without undue delay to enhance occupant protection 
measures from CBR attacks. Higher risk facilities such as 
national assets, seats of political and financial powers, industrial 
and military facilities, subway systems, important medical 
facilities well as law enforcement facilities require to take 
special considerations. Besides preparatory recommendations, 
specific recommendations must be chalked out and followed 
for every facility for safety and security of the occupants. 
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5.3 Pre-screening and Surveillance 
Screening refers to all the techniques and methods used in 
protecting staff and critical resources from accidental/malicious 
harm, crime, attack or other threats. Large numbers of public 
and very important persons may be visiting these facilities 
every day. This represents potential targets for terrorism 
because of the number of people located at a particular site in a 
specified time frame. Similarly, crowded locations present the 
high potential of death rate with attacks on national assets, and 
ability of the terrorist for creation of hostage crisis. Screening 
attempts may prevent any threats or potentially dangerous 
situations from arising. If security succeeds in this, the chances 
of any dangerous situations, threats or illegal items entering 
into building may be greatly reduced. Access controls should 
allow to the facilities and restricted areas, e.g., certain days of 
the week or shifts. In addition to controlling passage in and 
out of facilities or areas, determining who belongs and does 
not, and the ability to observe and track movement in and 
out of controlled areas has advantage. Agencies may permit 
access for various combinations of persons as well as assets, 
depending on the requirements and restrictions.
Basic principle for pre-screening may includes limited 
number of entry points; secured areas identification and 
dedicating; providing transition areas for secure and non-
secure areas; minimising interference with the movement of 
passengers as well as system operations; layering (multiple 
layers) of security systems; using protective measures 
addressing all attack detection, mitigation, phases-deterrence, 
defence, response and recovery; providing an audit trail and 
transaction reporting capability. The ability to know intrusion 
detection is when someone has entered in a secured area, may 
include the ability to determine and identifying of intruder. 
This tracking of movement may include both authorised and 
unauthorised activity, and serves as both a staff management 
and a security tool.
Surveillance is the ability to monitor a specified area 
and may occur through on-site personnel or via remote 
technologies, using CCTV, unmanned aerial vehicles as well as 
other platforms attached with sophisticated CBR detectors etc.. 
In the premise or buildings, provision for adequate lightening 
should be there so to clearly see the entry and exit point as 
well other parts of the buildings. Surveillance systems vary 
in terms of detecting and recording capabilities. Policies and 
procedures must be clear for entry-point screening along with 
prompt communications and information processing systems. 
Recommendation of security personnel should be quick and 
implementable. 
5.4 Evacuation during CBR Emergency
Evacuation an immediate and urgent step to take people 
away from the site of incident. Emergency evacuation plans 
are developed to ensure the safest, speedy and most efficient 
evacuation of all expected occupants of a building. benchmark 
‘evacuation time’ for different hazards and conditions must 
be established during pre-event planning and execution 
phase. These established benchmarks can be set by using best 
practices, regulations, or employing simulation procedure (such 
as modelling the flow of people from building) or to determine 
doing the actual mock drill with prompt response. The use 
of multiple exits from proper planning structure, contra-flow 
lanes, and special technologies would lead to ensure full, fast 
and complete evacuation. Personal consideration may affect 
an individuals ability to evacuate and shall be taken into 
account. Evacuation Alerts, including visual alerts, audio and 
alarm signals may be used. The codes on buildings can be 
used to reduce the possibility of panic by allowing individuals 
to process the need to self-evacuate without causing alarm. 
Planning in a proper way would implement an all-hazards 
approach so that plans can be reused for multiple hazards that 
could exist.
The evacuation sequence can be divided into the different 
phases like detection, decision making, protection and alarm 
for people, shifting of those to shelters or an assembly station, 
and transportation. For important national buildings, adequate 
collective protection shelters must be planned in advance.
5.5 multi-agency response for mitigation of cBr 
Attacks
To effectively mitigate or reduce the CBR risk, emergency 
preparedness must be the primary priority. It could enable the 
response team to combat a variety of such hazards efficiently. 
Awareness of the people for hazard mitigation and emergency 
preparedness will go a long way to protect themselves from 
released CBR agents. Threat detection should be faster 
to timely classify the category of hazards. Emergency 
preparedness models in government organisations/agencies 
suffer from many regulatory limitations. Hazard mitigation 
management must compete with routine demands as well as 
for space on the organisation agenda. Emergency preparedness 
management programs are difficult to implement because 
they tends to be viewed as an intractable problem. Due to 
policies that lack clear measurable performance objectives, 
jurisdiction with insufficient resources and minimal official 
support, Government on higher levels may fail to provide 
sufficient emergency management guidance with local 
jurisdictions. Only a very few organisationsare specifically 
evaluated periodically on the preparedness to continued 
business operations.
Since CBR attacks come without warning, emergency 
preparedness plan and precautions including preventive 
vigilance against terrorists are needed. An emergency 
contingency plan should be designed and tested periodically 
during regular trainings table tops and mock exercises. An 
internal room for sheltering in place, preferably on the top/
middle level and windowless to restrict air-flow must be 
earmarked. No single agency is fully capable to response to 
such attacks. The essence of a well-structured and coordinated 
multi-agency response is assessment of capabilities and 
limitations of various stakeholders and responders. Mutual-
aid agreements among various responding and stake holding 
agencies and other techno-legal documents should be drafted 
as a part of pre-event planning. 
5.6 Development of Capabilities and Procedures
first step for any accidental CBR release in confined 
space is to identify the agent employed. Biological agents 
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never cause immediate symptoms while chemical agents may 
do so. If there is any biological agent suspected, goal must be 
to first detect and reduce the total number of people exposed 
while for chemical release, one should aim to minimise the 
concentrations to which people shall be exposed. Evacuation 
of the buildings should be done safely in such a manner so 
that the meeting point is in upwind air direction. For ‘shelter-
in-place’ the responsibilities is of keeping the place identified 
and ready. Sequence of critical steps includes: Main decision-
making: evacuation from the building following immediate 
turning off the HVAC systems, contacting authorities (fire 
and emergency department, police), building occupants to be 
provided instructions and proper coordination with the first aid 
providers and medical first responders and HVAC operators. 
For chemical release area: It is very important to leave the 
system operating without alteration, unless a knowledgeable 
operator has to handle and perform HVAC manipulation. The 
HVAC system will provide some outdoor air and will exhaust 
some indoor air, so it will help to dilute the chemical and 
exhaust it from the building under normal operation. 
For biological release: HVAC system to shut off and 
close outdoor air dampers. Local exhausts to serve bathrooms 
and kitchens, must be shut off. These immediate actions would 
prevent the building from becoming a source of contamination 
for people outside. The outdoor air to provide for an evacuation 
route including stairways should be pressurised. Segregate 
people known to be exposed, to avoid cross contamination, 
and tag or mark these people for further follow up. Risk based 
approach, threat dynamics, false alarm screening deterrent and 
risk model approach, are of utmost importance for effective 
response. Realistic vulnerability assessment, attack prevention 
and passive protection need proper attention. A schematic 
depiction of the CBR threats, vulnerabilities and preparedness 
in terms of capacity development, is as given in Fig. 3..
5.7 decontamination strategies for toxic cBr 
Agents
The recent turmoil situations in many parts of Middle 
East and the increased risk of perceived CBR attack have 
raised alarm bells for CBR defence management. In situations 
involving CBR exposure and possible contamination, evacuees 
shall be decontaminated prior to being moved into clean areas 
to reduce body burden of hazardous CBR substances. CBR 
Emergencies requires technology smart multifunctional/
self-usable devices for personnel/mass decontamination. 
Decontamination is a complex process involving the 
conversion of toxic chemicals into harmless end products. 
Physical decontamination (scrubbing, brushing, dislodging, 
displacement, rinsing, evaporation, scraping, and wiping 
with wet clay and Fuller’s earth) is easy to implement. Wet 
decontamination involves flushing with water or applying the 
chemical decontaminants. It possess some challenges like cross 
contamination; hypothermia; and needs trained personnel. It 
also results in large amount of hazardous waste generation and 
may be dangerous due to corrosive nature of decontamination 
agent. 
 Responder forces, operating in a potential or actual CBR 
attack zone should formulate active counter terrorism functions 
that are doable without prejudicing operational tempo and 
combat effectiveness. Chemical warfare agents could kill 
immediately or incapacitate the affected individuals even when 
they are present with low concentration. These toxic agents 
should be removed immediately to minimise their deleterious 
health effects. Similarly, radiological materials are also to be 
removed as soon as possible to reduce the risk of exposure as 
well as internalisation of contamination. Since, decontamination 
is both a science as well as an art, it require extensive training 
to develop required skills. In addition, decontamination team 
should preferably be cross trained in various tasks because they 
must be capable of changing roles as per situation’s demand. 
Employees need to be trained in performance of simple task to 
multiple tasks, learn how to function after wearing individual 
protection equipment (IPE), and to work as a team for CBR 
emergency response continuum. Rehearsal can produce 
effective teams. Physicians, paramedics, and nurses designated 
to provide treatment to CBR contaminated casualties needs 
specific training in medical management of CBR attacks. In 
CBR MCI, the responder to take account of chemical agents and 
also the dispersal route, this can modify operations including 
PPE, the method of decontamination and expectation to the 
number of possible victims. The various dispersal routes are 
through aerosol, thermal detonation, addition in to water and 
food supply chain and even human contact. Standard operating 
procedures for decontamination
•  Reduce contact with hazardous waste that has the potential 
for contamination
•  Stress on practices that could minimises hazardous 
material contact
•  Collect remote sampling, handling, and container-opening 
techniques and protection of monitoring/sampling 
instruments by bagging in appropriate packages
• Wear or use disposable outer garments/equipment
•  Cover equipment/tools with strippable coatings, removable 
during decontamination
•  Encase the source of contaminant with protective materials 
to prevent cross contamination and exposure.
Place clothing into black plastic bags and spectacles, 
figure 3. doctrine for the assessment of cBr attack threat 
and vulnerability mechanism to develop capabilities 
to successfully counter such malicious activities.
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wallets ornaments mobiles etc., in a transparent zipped 
pack for further decontaminating and/or disposal. The most 
important and most effective decontamination should be 
done within few minutes after exposure/contamination. 
Self-decontamination, by the victims will make a significant 
impact on the difference between survival (minimal injury) 
and death (severe injury).
5.8 cBr training exercises for the occupants 
of the facilities
Training of all emergency functionaries including 
district authorities and specialised first responders is an 
important prerequisite for the efficient management of 
CBR emergency. Medical preparedness is the weakest link 
in all CBR plans and the gap need to be filled with technical 
expertise and personal experience using training and mock 
exercises. Specific training modules need to be prepared, 
tested and implemented at different levels for emergency 
management. Normally occupants lack knowledge of CBR 
agents and their effect on health, recommended treatment 
profile and antidotes. Skill and competence are two pillars 
of resilience that one achieved through training. Exercising 
is the toughest part of learning, while training is the soul of 
transformation. Regular training of the establishment employees 
can help to protect, prevent, deter and respond to act of terrorism 
involving hazardous or toxic CBR agents. Imparting basic level 
of knowledge and understanding through training courses can 
help in framing proper instructions, advanced competencies, 
technology and tactics, focused to the CBR threats. Figure 4 
represent different CBR skill enhancement modules that can be 
used to strengthen CBR response and cope up capacity based 
on the future needs.
Mock exercises should be conducted to allow occupants 
and responders to check their preparedness for locating and 
identifying the toxic substances and practice co-ordination 
with other responders and emergency functionaries to reinforce 
their skills and knowledge in a realistic training environment. 
The military, paramilitary and elite forces have stood the test 
of time in providing prompt, efficient, and highest degrees 
of mitigation and relief measures to not only its dependent 
clientele but also to civil authorities during CBR emergencies. 
Multi-agency integration and interoperability are the two 
biggest challenges to the participants in co-ordinating an 
effective CBR response. Goal of training is to avoid the failure 
to CBR events (Fig. 5).
6. cBr resILIence cHALLenges
Critical infrastructures and national assets belong to 
different stakeholders. Planning for their protection and 
response in the event of CBR attacks is not easy. Deployment 
of on-site and off-site CBR detectors is an important limiting 
factor. Training is critical to the success of broad spectrum 
response operations executed by multiple agencies. Most of 
the current training methodologies and technologies are not 
well-suited for addressing emergent training requirements 
for critical structures protection and response. Co-ordination 
between different response agencies, academia and industry to 
optimally utilise global technologies and maintaining a self-
sustenance process for CBR defence is an important challenge. 
Global training and education needs of today’s demographics 
should be met by using innovative instructional medium. The 
ability to train and communicate due to the vast nature of the 
scope with limited connectivity and infrastructure needed to be 
developed. Inadequate training infrastructure and trainers for 
training is another limiting factor. Non-standardised training 
equipment, systems and methodologies, lack of facilities for 
field/simulation based trainings and inadequate enhancement 
of capabilities of trainers at regular intervals, are some of the 
impediments for CBR resilience.
Figure 4. Advanced skill enhancement training facilities required to 
cope up with the emerging cBr threats. this will enhance 
capability and overall preparedness to efficiently combat 
cBr terrorism. Inclusion of e-Learning and use of mobile 
platforms will be a step towards moving from class room 
training to technology centric training.
figure 5. road map for cBr mitigation and towards enhancing 
resilience to identify needs of novel technologies. 
Awareness generation, technology- focus training and 
CBR Forensics lab should be developed as capacity 
development measure for crisis management. 
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7. concLusIons
A national code of practice for security needs to be 
designed and promulgated. There should be pro-active 
integration of CBR intelligence into military doctrine and 
civil emergency planning. Furthermore, its implementation by 
occupants/managers of facilities and other related structures is 
to be ensured. Immediate alert and early warning system can 
help to reduce level of severity of any CBR incident. Airborne 
warning and control system system could help to reduce 
vulnerabilities to a great extent. for the confined buildings, 
HVAC should be equipped with rapid CBR detectors so 
that the air could be quickly redirected through scrubbers to 
remove these agents. Universal full time basic protection, 
preparedness and capacity development includes mitigation 
measures, medical management, augmenting equipment, skills 
and strategies to protect both personnel and national assets. 
Training (not a one-time event) should also provide guidance 
on the implementation of codes of conduct, development of 
communication skills among different agencies, improvement 
of productive collaboration and endorsement of confidentiality. 
Mobile and ready-to-task field laboratories, mobile hospitals, 
mobile specialist teams and units for immediate response of 
the attacks should always be in provisioned. A network of 
reach- back experts should be available to provide prompt 
and continuous scientific CBR mitigation support and advice 
to control chaos. Security plan need to be revisited at regular 
intervals to make sure that there are no flaws in it. Last, but 
not the least, improved co-ordination between intelligence 
agencies, military, civilian responders, other security agencies, 
as well as emergency functionaries, is absolutely essential 
to keep a preventive vigilance and develop strong response 
mechanisms.
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